Message time of arrival codes: A fundamental primitive for secure distance measurement
Abstract
Secure distance measurement and therefore secure Time-of-Arrival (ToA) measurement is critical for applications such as contactless payments, passive-keyless entry and start systems, and navigation systems. This paper initiates the study of Message Time of Arrival Codes (MTACs) and their security. MTACs represent a core primitive in the construction of systems for secure ToA measurement. By surfacing MTACs in this way, we are able for the first time to formally define the security requirements of physical-layer measures that protect ToA measurement systems against attacks. Our viewpoint also enables us to provide a unified presentation of existing MTACs (such as those proposed in distance-bounding protocols and in a secure distance measurement standard) and to propose basic principles for protecting ToA measurement systems against attacks that remain unaddressed by existing mechanisms. We also use our perspective to systematically explore the tradeoffs between security and performance that apply to all signal modulation techniques enabling ToA measurements. © 2020 IEEE.
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BibTex
@INPROCEEDINGS{leu2020message,
isbn = {978-1-7281-3497-0},
doi = {10.1109/SP40000.2020.00010},
year = {2020-07-30},
booktitle = {2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)},
volume = {2020-May},
type = {Conference Paper},
institution = {EC},
author = {Leu, Patrick and Singh, Mridula and Roeschlin, Marc and Paterson, Kenneth G. and Capkun, Srdjan},
abstract = {Secure distance measurement and therefore secure Time-of-Arrival (ToA) measurement is critical for applications such as contactless payments, passive-keyless entry and start systems, and navigation systems. This paper initiates the study of Message Time of Arrival Codes (MTACs) and their security. MTACs represent a core primitive in the construction of systems for secure ToA measurement. By surfacing MTACs in this way, we are able for the first time to formally define the security requirements of physical-layer measures that protect ToA measurement systems against attacks. Our viewpoint also enables us to provide a unified presentation of existing MTACs (such as those proposed in distance-bounding protocols and in a secure distance measurement standard) and to propose basic principles for protecting ToA measurement systems against attacks that remain unaddressed by existing mechanisms. We also use our perspective to systematically explore the tradeoffs between security and performance that apply to all signal modulation techniques enabling ToA measurements. © 2020 IEEE.},
language = {en},
address = {Piscataway, NJ},
publisher = {IEEE},
title = {Message time of arrival codes: A fundamental primitive for secure distance measurement},
PAGES = {500 - 516},
Note = {41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP2020) (virtual); Conference Location: San Francisco, CA, USA; Conference Date: May 18-20, 2020; Due to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) the conference was conducted virtually.}
}Research Collection: 20.500.11850/444383