UWB-ED: Distance Enlargement Attack Detection in Ultra-Wideband
Abstract
Mobile autonomous systems, robots, and cyber-physical systems rely on accurate positioning information. To conduct distance-measurement, two devices exchange signals and, knowing these signals propagate at the speed of light, the time of arrival is used for distance estimations. Existing distance-measurement techniques are incapable of protecting against adversarial distance enlargement-a highly devastating tactic in which the adversary reissues a delayed version of the signals transmitted between devices, after distorting the authentic signal to prevent the receiver from identifying it. The adversary need not break crypto, nor compromise any upper-layer security protocols for mounting this attack. No known solution currently exists to protect against distance enlargement. We present Ultra-Wideband Enlargement Detection (UWB-ED), a new modulation technique to detect distance enlargement attacks, and securely verify distances between two mutually trusted devices. We analyze UWB-ED under an adversary that injects signals to block/modify authentic signals. We show how UWB-ED is a good candidate for 802.15.4z Low Rate Pulse and the 5G standard.
Research Area: Secure Ranging and Positioning
People
BibTex
@inproceedings{singh2019uwb-ed,
author = {Singh, Mridula and Leu, Patrick and Abdou, Abdelrahman Mohamed and Capkun, Srdjan},
title = {{UWB-ED: Distance Enlargement Attack Detection in Ultra-Wideband}},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium (SEC'19)},
address = {Santa Clara, CA, USA},
year = 2019,
month = aug,
publisher = {USENIX Association},
url = {https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/309346/UWB_ED.pdf}
}Research Collection: 20.500.11850/309346