ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution

Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium

Abstract

Security architectures such as Intel SGX need protection against rollback attacks, where the adversary violates the integrity of a protected application state by replaying old persistently stored data or by starting multiple application instances. Successful rollback attacks have serious consequences on applications such as financial services. In this paper, we propose a new approach for rollback protection on SGX. The intuition behind our approach is simple. A single platform cannot efficiently prevent rollback, but in many practical scenarios, multiple processors can be enrolled to assist each other. We design and implement a rollback protection system called ROTE that realizes integrity protection as a distributed system. We construct a model that captures adversarial ability to schedule enclave execution and show that our solution achieves a strong security property: the only way to violate integrity is to reset all participating platforms to their initial state. We implement ROTE and demonstrate that distributed rollback protection can provide significantly better performance than previously known solutions based on local non-volatile memory.

Research Area: Trusted Computing

People

Dr. Siniša Matetić
Doctoral Student (2015 – 2019)
SwissSign Group AG
Mansoor Ahmed
Researcher (2016 – 2017)
PhD student, University of Cambridge
Dr. Kari Kostiainen
Senior Scientist
Dr. Aritra Dhar
Doctoral Student (2016 – 2021)
Huawei Research Labs Zurich
Dr. David Sommer
Doctoral Student (2015 – 2021)
Zühlke, Zurich
Dr. Arthur Gervais
Doctoral Student (2012 – 2017)
Lecturer, Imperial College

BibTex

@INPROCEEDINGS{matetic2017rollback,
	isbn = {978-1-931971-40-9},
	year = {2017-01},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium},
	type = {Conference Paper},
	editor = {Kirda, Engin and Ristenpart, Thomas},
	author = {Matetic, Sinisa and Ahmed, Mansoor and Kostiainen, Kari and Dhar, Aritra and Sommer, David and Gervais, Arthur and Juels, Ari and Capkun, Srdjan},
	abstract = {Security architectures such as Intel SGX need protection against rollback attacks, where the adversary violates the integrity of a protected application state by replaying old persistently stored data or by starting multiple application instances. Successful rollback attacks have serious consequences on applications such as financial services. In this paper, we propose a new approach for rollback protection on SGX. The intuition behind our approach is simple. A single platform cannot efficiently prevent rollback, but in many practical scenarios, multiple processors can be enrolled to assist each other. We design and implement a rollback protection system called ROTE that realizes integrity protection as a distributed system. We construct a model that captures adversarial ability to schedule enclave execution and show that our solution achieves a strong security property: the only way to violate integrity is to reset all participating platforms to their initial state. We implement ROTE and demonstrate that distributed rollback protection can provide significantly better performance than previously known solutions based on local non-volatile memory.},
	language = {en},
	address = {Berkeley, CA},
	publisher = {USENIX Association},
	title = {ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution},
	PAGES = {1289 - 1306},
	Note = {26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 2017); Conference Location: Vancouver, Canada; Conference Date: August 16-18, 2017}
}

Research Collection: 20.500.11850/258784